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Introduction
Hazardous substances are found throughout the modern
industrialized world. Over the past twenty years, the amounts
of chemicals produced have increased dramatically.1 In view
of this continuing growth in production and use, it has be-
come increasingly difficult for people to avoid the risks associ-
ated with these chemicals. Hazards arise in the work place,
the home, and the environment. People are particularly at
risk if they live near a hazardous waste dump site. The Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act (CERCLA)2 was enacted by Congress to reduce this
risk, but despite its purpose, the number of sites that have
been cleaned up is quite small.3 When injury results from ex-
posure to hazardous substances, the majority of individuals
cannot look to a federal statute to provide direct compensa-
tion for their injuries, but must rely on state tort compensa-
tion actions.4
CERCLA provides a basis for citizens who are threatened
by the release of hazardous substances to become involved in
the response system. In addition, CERCLA provides citizens
1. Davis & Magee, Cancer and Industrial Chemical Production, 206 Sci. 1356-58
(1979).
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9673 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) [hereinafter CERCLA].
3. In 1989, of the 29,714 sites inventoried as potentially hazardous, only 1,010
were listed to receive remedial action, and only 259 remedies were implemented or
are in progess. ENIVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SUPERFUND PROGRESS REPORT
(1989).
4. There are limited, particularized federal victim compensation schemes that
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with information concerning hazardous substances and their
potential effects on human health. Part II of this comment
gives a brief overview of the CERCLA system. Part III exam-
ines measures citizens can take to initiate cleanup of a hazard-
ous waste site and recover costs which they have incurred.
Part IV sets forth the CERCLA sections which enable citizens
to initiate government cleanup, participate in developing a
cleanup plan, and oversee the final remedial action. Part V
discusses the provisions which provide information concerning
hazardous substances and examines the value of such infor-
mation with respect to a toxic tort suit. Part VI concludes
that despite the limitations of the CERCLA citizen suit provi-
sion, CERCLA provides citizens with an important role in
hazardous site cleanup and arms them with valuable informa-
tion concerning hazardous substances.
II. The CERCLA System
CERCLA was enacted to give the federal government au-
thority to respond to releases5 of hazardous substances 6 from
facilities. 7 A fund, financed by an excise tax on petroleum and
5. The term "release" means "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting,
emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the
environment .... " CERCLA, supra note 2, at § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22).
6. The term "hazardous substance" means:
(A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33
[referring to the Clean Water Act], (B) any element, compound, mixture, so-
lution, or substance designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title [9602
refers to designation of additional hazardous substances and establishment of
reportable released quantities; regulations], (C) any hazardous waste having
the characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the
Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. § 6921] . . . (D) any toxic pollutant
listed under section 1317(a) of Title 33 [referring to Clean Water Act], (E)
any hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42
U.S.C. § 7412], and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or
mixture with respect to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant
to section 2606 of Title 15 [ referring to the Toxic Substances Control Act].
Id. at § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
7. The term "facility" means:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (includ-
ing any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond,
lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling
stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/11
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feedstock chemicals, was created to pay for the cleanups.' The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was given authority
to compel or arrange for cleanup and to seek reimbursement
from the Fund" or from potentially responsible parties
(PRPs).'0 This is accomplished through a scheme of strict lia-
bility imposed upon a broad range of PRPs.11 The govern-
ment's responses include either removal action"s or remedial
action.1 3 In addition to government-initiated cleanups, a pri-
vate party may pay the costs of cleanup and seek reimburse-
ment from the responsible parties. 4
III. Private Party Cost Recovery Actions
A. Elements
It is argued that section 107(a) of CERCLA provides a
direct statutory right of private action to enable citizens to
recover costs incurred in cleaning up a hazardous waste site.
The statute provides that certain enumerated parties 15 are lia-
ble for costs "incurred by any other person, consistent with
the national contingency plan [NCP]..'. "Person" is broadly
defined to include "an individual, firm, corporation, associa-
been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be
located ...
Id. at § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
8. I.R.C. §§ 4611 and 4661-4662 (1988).
9. See CERCLA, supra note 2, at § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
10. Id. at § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 9611.
11. For a list of PRPs, see CERCLA, supra note 2, at § 107(a)(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. §
9607(a)(1)-(4).
12. Removal action is typically taken in the event of an emergency, when action
needs to be taken quickly. 2 NovICK, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION §
13.05[3][a][i] (1988).
13. Remedial action typically involves long-term clean-up where time is not of
the essence. A remedial action involves four steps: 1) a Remedial Investigation/Feasi-
bility Study (RI/FS), which assesses the problem; 2) a Record of Decision (ROD),
which sets forth the cleanup plan based on analysis of the data from the RI/FS; 3) a
Remedial Design (RD), or cleanup plan, which specifies how the site will be cleaned
up; and 4) a Remedial Action (RA), the implementation of the cleanup plan. See
generally 2 NOVICK, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 13.05[3] (1988).
14. CERCLA, supra note 2, at § 107(a), (e), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), (e).
15. Id. at § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
16. Id. at § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
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tion, partnership, consortium, joint venture, [or] commercial
entity .... ,,17 The administrative regulations interpreting
CERCLA lend support for private cost recovery by promoting
private cleanup. The EPA writes that "in determining the
need for and in planning and undertaking Fund-financed ac-
tion, the lead agency shall, to the extent practicable, ...
[c]onserve Fund monies by encouraging private party
cleanup." 18 Despite this seemingly express authority for pri-
vate causes of action, the courts are split as to what circum-
stances authorize it.
In order for a citizen to bring a cost recovery action, it
must be shown that (1) a hazardous substance (2) is released
into the environment (3) from a facility (4) causing the indi-
vidual to incur necessary response costs (5) which are consis-
tent with the NCP.19 The first three elements are clearly de-
fined in the statute and have been further clarified by the
courts. CERCLA section 101(14) defines "hazardous sub-
stance" by referencing substances designated as hazardous in
a number of other environmental statutes.2 0 To prove that a
substance is hazardous, a party need only show that the sub-
stance is listed in one of the referenced statutes or that it con-
stitutes "any element, compound, solution, or substance desig-
nated pursuant to section 9602" of CERCLA.21
The statute defines "release" clearly and comprehen-
sively22 and a number of courts have broadly interpreted this
definition. For example, in Missouri v. Independent Pe-
trochemical Corp.,23 the court found that a release of a haz-
ardous substance occurred when waste oil containing dioxin
was sprayed onto a horse track at a ranch.24 In addition to
17. Id. at § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
18. National Oil & Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.61(c)(3) (1988).
19. See, e.g., U.S. Envt'l Protection Agency, Guidance Document: Cost Recovery
Actions under CERCLA (1983) cited in Crowell & Moring, SUPERFUND MANUAL: LE-
GAL AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 4-19 (1987).
20. CERCLA, supra note 2, at § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
21. Id.
22. Id. at § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22).
23. 610 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
24. Id. at 5.
[Vol. 6
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imposing liability for releases that have already occurred, §
107(a) specifically states that persons are liable for a
threatened release.2 5 In New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,26
the court rejected the defendants' position that CERCLA lim-
its liability only to past releases. The court held that "leaking
tanks and pipelines, the continuing leaching and seepage from
the earlier spills, and the leaking drums all constitute 're-
leases.' ",27 The court went on to hold that "corroding and de-
teriorating tanks, [the defendant's] lack of expertise in han-
dling hazardous waste, and even the failure to license the
facility, amount to 'a threat of release.' ",28
"Facility" is also broadly defined in the statute,2 and
courts that have construed the term 'facility' have recognized
its expansive definition. In State v. General Electric Co.,30 the
court stated that "the definition of "facility" is necessarily a
broad one. It explicitly [includes] . .. among other things,
any site or area where a hazardous substance has been depos-
ited, stored, disposed of, or otherwise come to be located.""1
The final two elements, necessary response costs and con-
sistency with the NCP, have not been uniformly defined by
the courts. The court in Levin Metals Corporation v. Parr-
Richmond Terminal Co. 32 used a plain language interpreta-
tion of the term "necessary costs of response." It pointed out
that this term as a whole is not defined in CERCLA, however,
the term "response" is defined to mean "removal . . . and re-
medial action." 33 The Levin Metals court noted that "section
25. CERCLA, supra note 2, at § 107(a)(4)(A).
26. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
27. Id. at 1045.
28. Id.
29. Section 9601(9) states that "the term 'facility' means (A) any building, struc-
ture, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline . . .well, pit, pond, lagoon, . . . or (B)
any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of,
or placed, or otherwise come to be located .... CERCLA, supra note 2, at § 101(9),
42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
30. 592 F. Supp. 291 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
31. Knox v. AC & S. Inc., 690 F. Supp. 752, 756 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (citing, State v.
General Electric Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 295 (N.D.TT U. 1984)).
32. 608 F. Supp. 1272 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
33. Id. at 1275.
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9601(23) defines 'removal' to mean 'cleanup or removal of re-
leased hazardous substances from the environment,' and in-
cludes actions necessary 'to prevent, minimize, or mitigate
damages to the public health or welfare or to the environ-
ment. '34 "Remedial action" is defined by section 9601(24) to
mean "those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken
... to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous sub-
stances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial dan-
ger to present or future public health or welfare or the
environment."35
Other courts have held that in order for costs to be "nec-
essary", they must be authorized or required by the govern-
ment.3 The issue of pre-authorization also arises in the con-
text of cleanup plans. A number of courts have held that in
order for costs to be "consistent with the NCP," cleanup
plans must be pre-approved by the government before they
can be implemented. For example, in Bulk Distribution Cen-
ters, Inc. v. Monsanto Co.,37 the court reasoned that prior
government approval would assure that the cleanup plan was
extensive enough to alleviate danger.3" Additionally, the gov-
ernment, because of the scientific and technological expertise
its environmental agencies possess, is better equipped to de-
cide the efficacy of a cleanup proposal.39 The court concluded
that "the only practical way to safeguard the public's interest,
while fairly mediating the competing concerns for the parties
potentially responsible for cleaning up the release, is for the
government to approve the cleanup proposal before it is im-
plemented by the private part[y]. 40
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1275-76.
36. See Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc, 792 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1986); NL
Industries Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1986); City of New York v. Exxon
Corp., 24 E.R.C. 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628
F. Supp. 391 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
37. 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1080 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
38. Id. at 1088.
39. Id.
40. Id. See also Artesian Waters Co. v. Government of New Castle, 605 F. Supp.
1348 (D. Del. 1985); Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co., 21 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1108 (S.D. Cal. 1984).
[Vol. 6
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A better reasoned approach would be one that does not
require such government pre-authorization." First, the EPA
does not have the resources to examine and approve every
plan proposed by a private party. If such government pre-au-
thorization were required, the EPA would have to institute an
entire division devoted solely to that purpose. Secondly, the
requirement of government pre-authorization would seriously
impede the purpose of CERCLA, i.e., the quick and efficient
cleanup of hazardous waste sites. Finally, the NCP provides
ample guidance in and of itself so that the efficacy of the
cleanup would be assured.
Additional support for this interpretation is found in the
Preamble to the NCP. The Preamble, in an effort to eliminate
confusion as to whether the regulations prohibited remedial
action without prior EPA approval, states that:
[Section 300.25(d)] has been rewritten to require that
persons who intend to undertake response actions and
seek reimbursement from the Fund, must obtain a pre-
authorization order for the response action to be consid-
ered consistent with the Plan for purposes of section
[111(a)(2)] of ... Section 300.25(d) does not apply to
private parties who undertake response actions, but do
not intend to seek reimbursement from the fund.42
B. Statute of Limitation Considerations Within CERCLA
and SARA
When a private party incurs response costs and wants to
recover them from the responsible parties he must be aware of
the applicable statutes of limitations. Although CERCLA sec-
tion 112(d) created a statute of limitations, confusion as to
whether the section applied to claims for recovery of response
costs or only to claims brought against the Fund43 convinced
41. See Pinole Point Properties v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283
(N.D. Cal. 1984).
42. 47 Fed. Reg. 31196 (1982) (emphasis added).
43. Most courts have held that CERCLA § 9612(d) [§112(d)] did not apply to
response cost claims. See, e.g., United States v. Dickerson, 640 F. Supp. 448 (D. Md.
1989]
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Congress to enact new statutes of limitations for both recov-
ery costs and claims against the Fund."' Under the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), claims
for recovery of damages to natural resources must be brought
within three years of the discovery of the loss and its connec-
tion with the release in question or the promulgation of regu-
lations under section 301(c), whichever is later.45 Claims for
recovery of response costs under section 107(a) must be
brought within six years after the date of completion of all
response actions.4
Questions arise regarding the applicable statute of limita-
tions when response costs were incurred prior to the enact-
ment of SARA and a suit was filed after the enactment of
SARA. The court in Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,47 was
confronted with this issue. Defendant Westinghouse argued
that since plaintiffs' response costs were incurred prior to the
enactment of SARA section 113, the court should use the
most analogous state statute rather than SARA.48 The court
agreed with the defendants' interpretation to the extent that
SARA did not apply. However, the court held that since a
CERCLA cost reimbursement action is not a damage action
(in which case an analogous state or federal statute would ap-
ply), but is rather an equitable action for restitution, the doc-
trine of laches applies.49 This characterization of CERCLA
cost reimbursement actions as equitable actions for restitution
has ample support in case law.5 0
1986); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898 (D. N.H. 1985); Kelly v. United
States, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1503 (W.D. Mich. 1985).
44. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 § 113(g)(2), 42
U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2) (Supp. IV 1986) [hereinafter SARA].
45. Id. at § 113(g)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(1).
46. Id. at § 113(g)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2).
47. 684 F. Supp. 852 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
48. Id. at 856.
49. Id. at 857.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Dickerson, 640 F. Supp. 448 (D. Md. 1986); United
States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mo. 1985); United States
v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898 (D. N.H. 1985). Although all of these cases involve gov-
ernment actions to recover response costs under CERCLA § 107, the same analysis
applies to private actions. Section 107 provides, in relevant part, that responsible par-
ties shall be liable for: "(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
[Vol. 6
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While the courts are split as to what circumstances au-
thorize private cost recovery, it is reasonable to conclude that
government pre-authorization of the response plan is not a
prerequisite to response cost recovery. Thus, if a citizen has
met the burden of proof on each of the required elements, and
the case is brought within the required statute of limitations,
response costs can be recovered. However, this is a very bur-
densome and expensive way to clean up a hazardous waste
site. It is therefore necessary to examine other sections of
CERCLA which are better designed to aid citizens.
IV. Use of CERCLA to Initiate and
Oversee Remedial Actions
A. Listing on the National Priorities List
A citizen 5 concerned about a release or a threatened re-
United States Government ...; (B) any other necessary costs of response incurred
by any other person .... " CERCLA, supra note 2, at § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607. Thus,
§ 107(4)(A) & (B) provides for similar relief whether the plaintiff is the government
or a private party.
If a private party brings a toxic tort claim in state court, SARA establishes a
discovery statute of limitations. Section 9658 provides in relevant part:
(a) State statutes of limitations for hazardous substance cases.
(1) Exception to state statutes.
In the case of any action brought under state law for personal injury, or prop-
erty damages, which are caused or contributed to by exposure to any hazard-
ous substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into the environment
from a facility, if the applicable limitations period for such action (as speci-
fied in the state statute of limitations or under common law) provides a com
mencement date which is earlier than the federally required commencement
date, such period shall commence at the federally required commencement
date in lieu of the date specified in such state statute.
(b) Definitions.
(4) Federally required commencement date.
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term "federally required com-
mencement date" means the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should
have known) that the personal injury or property damages referred to in sub-
section (a)(1) of this section were caused or contributed to by the hazardous
substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned.
SARA, supra note 44, at § 309, 42 U.S.C. § 9658. Thus, if a plaintiff can show that his
injury or property damage was (1) caused or contributed to by exposure to a hazard-
ous substance (2) released into the environment (3) by a facility, the statute of limita-
tions discovery rule will apply. Id.
51. Section 105(d) provides that "any person" may petition the Administrator.
9
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lease from a site not listed on the National Priority List
(NPL), and consequently, at which no removal or remedial ac-
tion has been taken, can petition the Administrator to con-
duct a preliminary assessment of the public health and envi-
ronmental hazards associated with the release. 2 If there has
been no previous assessment of the release, the Administrator
"shall, within 12 months after the receipt of any such petition,
complete such assessment or provide an explanation of why
the assessment is not appropriate."53 If the assessment indi-
cates that the release or threatened release may pose a threat
to human health or the environment, the site is ranked
through the hazard ranking system5 ' to determine its cleanup
priority. Citizens can petition the EPA either by telephoning
or writing to the appropriate EPA section,5 by writing to
their Congressman, or by contacting the State. Despite the
usefulness of this section in initiating government action,
there are very few preliminary assessment petitions. For ex-
ample, of the approximately three thousand sites listed on
CERCLIS5a in EPA Region II, that Region only receives ap-
proximately five petitions per month.57 Currently, in Region
II, these petitions are "never denied" as the Technical and
Preremedial Support Section "must perform a certain
amount" of preliminary assessments."
If the petitioner believes that a denial of a petition was
incorrect, he may seek judicial review.59
"Person" is defined in section 101(21) to include an "individual." CERCLA, supra
note 2, at § 105(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(d).
52. Id.
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. Id. at § 105(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(c).
55. The Technical and Preremedial Support Section in Region II would be the
appropriate section in that region as it deals with sites which have not been listed on
the NPL. See infra note 57.
56. CERCLIS is an inventory of potentially hazardous sites. CERCLA, supra
note 2, at § 116, 42 U.S.C. 9616.
57. Telephone conversation with Jeffery Gaal, Technical and Preremedial Sup-
port Section, Region II, New York (Apr. 18, 1989).
58. Id.
59. The Administrative Procedure Act provides that "[a] person suffering a legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." Ad-
[Vol. 6
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B. CERCLA Section 117 Public Participation
Once a site has been listed on the NPL and a Remedial
Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) ° has been performed
to determine what cleanup action will be taken, a Remedial
Design, or cleanup plan is made. Citizens can participate in
the selection of the plan. 1 Pursuant to section 117, the Ad-
ministrator or the State must 1) publish notice,62 which pro-
vides sufficient information to provide a reasonable explana-
tion and analysis of the proposed plan, the alternatives
considered, and make such plan available to the public, and 2)
provide a reasonable opportunity for written or oral com-
ments and an opportunity for a public meeting at or near the
site at issue. Transcripts of the meeting are to be made availa-
ble to the public.6 The final remedial plan must be published
and made available to the public before any remedial action is
taken. 4 The final plan must include a discussion of any signif-
icant changes from the proposed plan and response to signifi-
cant comments." This procedure is very similar to an infor-
mal rulemaking and, thus, may be subject to administrative
procedural requirements.
Particularly important to citizens participating in the
procedure are the requirements that the notice must ade-
quately apprise them of the issues involved, 6 and must be
ministrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982 & Supp. V). Additionally:
[a] preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not di-
rectly reviewable is subject to review on the final agency action. Except as
otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise final is final
for the purposes of this section whether or not there has been presented or
determined an application for a declaratory order, for any form or reconsid-
eration, or, unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that
the action meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency
authority.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1982).
60. See supra note 13.
61. CERCLA, supra note 2, at § 117, 42 U.S.C. § 9617.
62. "[P]ublication shall include, at a minimum, publication in a major local
newspaper of general circulation." Id. at § 117(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9617(d).
63. Id. at § 117(a)(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9617(a)(1)-(2).
64. Id. at § 117(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9617(b).
65. Id.
66. See Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1981).
1989]
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specific.6 7 Additionally, if the agency adopts a final rule that
differs from its proposal, the interested parties must have
been alerted by the notice to the changes eventually
adopted."8
No mention is made of how long or to what extent notice
must be given before the Administrator takes final remedial
action. However, the legislative history reveals that "[tihe
provision is not intended to be unreasonably burdensome for
the Administrator. Published information must be adequate
to inform the community of the proposed remedial action but
the Committee does not intend that the Administrator must
publish in local publications every shred of evidence or com-
munication which is available."69
A significant aspect of this section is the availability of
grants, not to exceed $50,000, to any group of individuals
which may be affected by a release or threatened release at a
site on the NPL.70 The purpose of the grant is to assist indi-
viduals with "interpreting information with regard to the na-
ture of the hazard, remedial investigation and feasibility
study, record of decision, remedial design, selection and con-
struction of remedial action, operation and maintenance, or
removal action at such facility. ' 71 The individuals must, how-
ever, contribute twenty percent of the total costs of the tech-
nical assistance for which the grant is used. This requirement
may be waived if the individuals can demonstrate financial
67. See National Tour Brokers v. United States, 591 F.2d 896 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
68. "Notice is adequate if the changes in the original plan are in character with
the original scheme, and the final rule is a logical outgrowth of the notice and com-
ments already given." Chocolate Manufacturers Ass'n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1105
(4th Cir. 1985) (quoting BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 642 (1st Cir.
1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 1096 (1980)); see also South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504
F.2d 646, 659 (1st Cir. 1974); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Taylor Diving & Salvage Co. v. Dep't of Labor, 599 F.2d 622, 626 (5th Cir. 1979);
Rowell v. Andrus, 631 F.2d 699, 702 n.2 (10th Cir. 1980).
69. H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2873. [hereinafter H.R. Rep.].
70. CERCLA, supra note 2, at § 117(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9617(e). This $50,000 limita-
tion may be waived by the Administrator "in any case where such waiver is necessary
to carry out the purposes of this subsection." Id. at § 117(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. §
9617(e)(2).
71. Id. at § 117(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9617(e)(1).
[Vol. 6
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need and that the waiver is necessary to facilitate public par-
ticipation in the selection of the remedial action at the site."
The intent of the provision is to allow communities to hire
technical consultants to assess data prepared by the EPA, not
to finance legal actions regarding the facility."
C. Section 310 Citizen Suits
A citizen suit provision, which was not included in the
1980 Superfund law, was added by Congress when it adopted
SARA.74 Under section 310, any person may bring a civil ac-
tion against:
(1) [A]ny person (including the United States ... who is
alleged to be in violation of any standard, regulation, con-
dition, requirement or order which has become effective
[under Superfund] . . . or
(2) [A]ny other officer of the United States (including the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
and the Administrator of the ASTDR) where there is an
alleged failure . . . to perform any discretionary act or
duty [which is not under Superfund]."
A citizen bringing an action alleging a violation of a stan-
dard or requirement must bring the action in the district
court for the district in which the alleged violation occurred.7 6
An action brought for failure to perform a non-discretionary
duty must be brought in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia."
Before commencing a lawsuit, the plaintiff must give sixty
days notice of any violation to the EPA Administrator, the
State in which the alleged violation occurred, and any alleged
violator. The section further provides that no suit may be
72. Id. at § 117(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9617(e)(2).
73. H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN, NEWS 2873.
74. CERCLA, supra note 2, at § 310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659.
75. Id. at § 310(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a) (emphasis added).
76. Id. at § 310(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(b)(1).
77. Id. at § 310(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(b)(2).
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brought under section 310(a)(1) if the Administrator has com-
menced or is diligently prosecuting an action under CERCLA
or the Solid Waste Disposal Act.78
The legislature omitted from the final SARA bill a provi-
sion which would have allowed citizens to sue private parties
to compel cleanup of a facility where there is an imminent
and substantial endangerment to the public health.7 9 The leg-
islative history gives three reasons for the omission. First, a
citizen's right to commence an injunctive action is set forth
under section 7002 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (com-
monly known as the Resource Conservation Recovery Act or
RCRA).8 ° Thus, a similar provision under CERCLA would be
redundant.81 Second, the omission does not impair the rights
of any person to bring an action under federal, state or com-
mon law.2 Third, if citizens were allowed to bring such suits,
they would interfere with the EPA cleanup program.8 3
The reasoning behind these rationales is puzzling. The
first rationale can be refuted by examining RCRA and CER-
CLA in the context of imminent and substantial endanger-
ment to the public health or environment. RCRA is more re-
strictive with respect to the types of hazards it regulates than
is CERCLA. Under the RCRA citizen suit section 7002, citi-
zens can bring an action against "any person . . . who has
contributed . . . to the past or present handling, [or] storage.
. of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an im-
minent and substantial endangerment to health or the envi-
ronment. '8 4 The term "hazardous waste"'  means a "solid
waste," including any solid, liquid, semisolid, or gaseous mate-
rial which may pose a substantial hazard to human health or
78. Id. at § 310(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(d).
79. H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2835, at 2964 (1986).
80. Resource Conservation Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991(i) (1982 &
Supp. V 1987) [hereinafter RCRA].
81. Supra note 79.
82. Id.
83. H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2835, at 2965 (1986).
84. RCRA, supra note 80, at § 7002, 42 U.S.C.§ 6972 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at § 1004(5)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5)(B).
[Vol. 6
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the environment.86 CERCLA, on the other hand, regulates
"any pollutant or contaminant which may present an immi-
nent and substantial danger ..8.7. Pollutant or contami-
nant is defined broadly to include "but [is] not limited to, any
element, compound, or mixture .. .which after release into
the environment. . . will or may be reasonably anticipated to
cause death, [or] disease . .. in such organisms or their off-
spring." Thus, since the two statutes regulate different types
of hazards, there is no foundation for the rationale that it
would be redundant to include within CERCLA a citizen's
suit provision to commence injunctive action in the face of an
imminent and substantial danger.
The second rationale can be refuted by examining the
many problems citizens have in bringing an action under com-
mon law. These cases are fraught with many problems such as
causation and statutes of limitation. 9
The third rationale can also be refuted by examining the
EPA cleanup statistics themselves. With no interference from
citizens in the five years after enactment of the Superfund
program, the "EPA has managed to complete cleanup at only
six National Priorities List sites and initiate cleanup work at
less than ten percent of those now listed."90 Additionally, a
study of citizen's suits brought under federal environmental
laws, conducted by the Environmental Law Institute, shows
that citizen's suit provisions, which include injunctive actions,
have had just the opposite result from that espoused in the
legislative history; rather than interfere, citizens have acted
both as a spur to initiate EPA action and as an alternative to
inadequate EPA enforcement.91
Despite the fact that a citizen cannot institute an injunc-
tive action under CERCLA to compel cleanup, there are a
number of avenues within the citizen's suit provision which
86. Id. at § 1004(27), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27). See also 40 C.F.R. § 261 (1984).
87. CERCLA, supra note 2, at § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (emphasis added).
88. Id. at § 101(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(2).
89. See M.T. SEARCY, A GUIDE TO Toxic TORTS (1989).
90. H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
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can be taken to assure that a cleanup is adequate.
1. CERCLA Section 310(a)(1) Violation of a Standard
or Requirement
Section 104 gives the EPA Administrator92 general au-
thority to act whenever there is a release or a threat of release
of a hazardous substance. The Administrator is authorized "to
remove or arrange for the removal of, and provide for reme-
dial action relating to such hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant at any time, . . . or take any other response
measure consistent with the national contingency plan which
the . . . [Administrator] deems necessary to protect the pub-
lic health or welfare or the environment."93 In addition, the
Administrator may undertake investigations, surveys, and
testing that he deems necessary to identify the existence and
extent of a release. 4 However, there are neither standards nor
mandatory duties which compel initial action. Nonetheless,
once the Administrator decides to take action, there are a
number of ways in which a citizen can assure adherence to the
standards set forth in the statute.
The cleanup standards set forth in section 121 provide a
primary avenue for citizen suits. In fact, the legislative history
reveals that section 121 and section 310 were meant to work
hand in hand to compel proper cleanup. The House Congres-
sional Record states that:
Such suits would involve allegations that the agency has
violated cleanup standards and other requirements of the
law and that citizens' health and environment would be
threatened if the agency was allowed to continue with its
illegal acts .... A major goal of the legislation is to es-
tablish specific, uniform national health standards that
will apply to EPA's cleanup decisions at Superfund sites.
While we fully expect the agency to adhere to these stan-
dards, past experience has demonstrated that enforce-
92. CERCLA, supra note 2, at § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1).
93. Id.
94. Id. at § 104(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b).
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ment of such legal requirements by affected citizens - act-
ing as private attorneys general - is an essential
component in the implementation of any detailed statu-
tory mandate. 5
Section 121 provides four requirements in selecting reme-
dial actions. The remedial action must 1) assure protection of
human health and the environment;9 2) be cost effective; 97 3)
use permanent solutions and alternative treatment technolo-
gies to the maximum extent practicable;9" and 4) meet appli-
cable or relevant and appropriate standards, requirements,
criteria, or guidance under Federal or State environmental
laws.9 In choosing between alternative remedial actions, the
Administrator must take into account a number of factors.1 °0
95. H.R. 1600, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. 9587 (1986).
96. CERCLA, supra note 2, at § 121(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(1).
97. Id. at § 121(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(a). Despite the requirement that remedial
actions must be cost effective, the legislative history is noteworthy in that it states
that this requirement does not contemplate the traditional cost/benefit analysis. The
Committee report states that "[t]he overriding mandate of this section is that, re-
gardless of cost, cleanup at each and every site must protect human health and the
environment." H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2880. Furthermore, the Congressional Record from the
House states that "the Agency shall not factor the costs of implementing the response
into its analysis. The costs of compliance will only become a factor in determining
which of several equally effective actions could meet the required standard of protec-
tion." 132 CONG. REC. 9596 (1986).
98. CERCLA, supra note 2, at § 121(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1).
99. Id. at § 121(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d). The remedial action does not have to
attain standards required under other Federal and State laws when 1) the remedial
action taken is only a part of a total remedial action that will attain such standard
when completed; 2) compliance with the standard will result in greater risk; 3) com-
pliance with the standard is technically impracticable; 4) the remedial action selected
will attain an equivalent standard through the use of another method; 5) with respect
to a State standard, the State has not consistently applied the standard in similar
circumstances; or 6) for remedial actions taken pursuant to section 9604, the selection
of a remedial action that attains such standard will not provide a balance between the
need for protection of public health and the environment, and the amounts available
from the Fund to respond to other dangerous sites. Id. at § 121(d)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii), 42
U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii).
100. These factors include:
(A) the long term uncertainties associated with land disposal;
(B) the goals, objectives, and requirements of the Solid Waste Disposal Act §
1002 et seq. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901 et seq.;
(C) the persistence, toxicity, mobility, and propensity to bioaccumulate of
17
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A citizen can challenge a remedial action pursuant to section
310(a)(1) if these factors are not taken into account.
As seen in section 104, any response action the Adminis-
trator takes must be consistent with the NCP 1" The NCP
sets forth a blueprint for removal and remedial actions under
CERCLA. The NCP includes a section known as the national
hazardous substance response plan which establishes proce-
dures and standards for responding to the release of hazard-
ous substances.10 2 These response standards must include the
minimum requirements set forth in section 105(a) in order to
pass statutory muster. 103 Pursuant to section 310(a)(1), citi-
such hazardous substances and their constituents;
(D) short and long-term potential for adverse health effects from human
exposure;
(E) long-term maintenance costs;
(F) the potential for future remedial action costs if the alternative remedial
action in question were to fail; and
(G) the potential threat to human health and the environment associated
with excavation, transportation,and redisposal, or containment.
Id. at §§ 121(b)(1)(A)-(G), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9621(b)(1)(A)-(G).
101. Id. at § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1). A NCP for the removal of oil and
hazardous substances was originally published pursuant to section 1321 of the Clean
Water Act and was revised pursuant to CERCLA section 104.
102. Id. at § 105(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a).
103. The plan must include at a minimum:
1) methods for discovering and investigating facilities where hazardous sub-
stances are located;
2) methods for evaluating and remedying releases or threats of releases which
pose substantial danger to the public or the environment;
3) methods for determining the appropriate extent of removal;
4) appropriate roles and responsibilities for Federal, State, local govern-
ments, and nongovernmental entities in carrying out the plan;
5) provisions for procurement, maintenance, and storage of response
equipment;
6) a method for reporting releases from facilities located on federally owned
property;
7) means of assuring cost effective remedial action over the period of poten-
tial exposure to the hazardous substances;
8) criteria for determining priority of releases for the purpose of taking reme-
dial action;
9) specification of roles for private organizations in responding to releases;
and
10) standards and testing procedures to determine whether alternative or in-
novative testing technologies are appropriate for response actions.
Id. at §§ 105(a)(1)-(10), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9605(a)(I)-(10).
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zens can challenge a response action if it does not meet the
minimum requirements of section 105(a).1 "°
Additionally, the NCP includes the NPL, a list of cites
that present the greatest danger to public health and the envi-
ronment and thus warrant cleanup before other non-listed
sites. The Administrator is to decide whether a site is to be
included on the NPL after consideration of a number of crite-
ria.'°5 A citizen wishing to challenge a decision by the Admin-
istrator not to list a site would be entitled to judicial review
pursuant to the citizen suit provision. ° Section 701 of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 0 provides that the ac-
tion of "each authority of the Government of the United
States" is subject to judicial review except to the extent that
"statutes preclude judicial review; or agency action is commit-
ted to agency discretion by law."' 0 8 The first exception would
not be applicable as the statute gives no evidence of a legisla-
tive intent to preclude review. 09 Likewise, the second excep-
tion would not be applicable, as this is a very narrow excep-
tion. The legislative history of the APA reveals that this
exception is only applicable where "statutes are drawn in such
narrow terms that in a given case there is no law to apply."' 10
104. "Following publication of the revised National Contingency Plan, the re-
sponse to and actions to minimize damage from hazardous substances releases, shall,
to the greatest extent possible, be in accordance with the provisions of the Plan." Id.
at § 105(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a).
105. Criteria for determining priorities among releases:
Shall be based upon relative risk or danger to public health or welfare or the
environment, in the judgment of the President, taking into account to the
extent possible the population at risk, the hazard potential of the hazardous
substances at such facilities, the potential for contamination of drinking
water supplies, the potential for direct human contact, the potential for de-
struction of sensitive ecosystems, the damage to natural resources which may
affect the human food chain and which is associated with any release or
threatened release, the contamination of the ambient air which is associated
with the release or threatened release, State preparedness to assume State
costs and responsibilities, and other appropriate factors.
Id. at § 105(a)(8)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(A).
106. CERCLA, supra note 2, at § 310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659.
107. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1964 & Supp. V 1987).
108. Id.
109. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967).
110. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945). See Citizens to Preserve
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The statute provides "law to apply" in the form of criteria
that must be considered. A reviewing court, applying the arbi-
trary and capricious test, could determine whether such crite-
ria were in fact considered.
2. Section 310(a)(2); Mandatory Duties
When drafting CERCLA, Congress gave the Administra-
tor very few non-discretionary duties. Thus, the citizen's role
in compelling such duties is quite limited. Nevertheless, when
the Administrator failed to publish the required NPL within
180 days after December 11, 1980, a citizen suit was brought
and a court order issued compelling her to publish the list.'
The Administrator is to revise the list annually," 2 and if he
does not do so, a citizen can bring a citizen suit pursuant to
section 310(a)(2) alleging a violation of a nondiscretionary
duty.
Section 105 requires revision of the Hazard Ranking Sys-
tem (HRS),"' 3 a system which the EPA uses to determine
what sites are to be cleaned up first. As with the revision of
the NPL, a citizen can bring a citizen suit if the Administra-
tor fails to revise the HRS.
3. Timing of Judicial Review
An important section that must be considered by citizens
who wish to challenge the adequacy of EPA cleanups is sec-
tion 113(h)(4).'" This section, specifying the timing of judicial
review, states, in relevant part, that:
No Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal
law . . . to review any challenges to removal or remedial
action selected under section 9606(a) of this title, in any
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560
(1975); compare Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
111. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Gorsuch, No. 82-2083 (D.D.C. Feb. 12,
1982).
112. CERCLA, supra note 2, at § 105(a)(8)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
114. Id. at § 113(h)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4).
[Vol. 6
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action except one of the following: . .. (4) An action
under section 9659 of this title (relating to citizens suits)
alleging that the removal or remedial action taken under
section 9604. . .or secured under 9606. . .was in viola-
tion of any requirement of this chapter. Such an action
may not be brought with regard to a removal action
where remedial action is to be undertaken at the site.'1 5
The legislative history attempts to clarify the intent of this
section by stating that:
[section 113(h)(4)] is designed to preclude lawsuits by any
person concerning particular segments of the response ac-
tion, as delineated in separate records of decision, until
those segments of the response have been constructed.
Completion of all of the work set out in a particular rec-
ord of decision marks the first opportunity at which re-
view of that portion of the response action can occur."'
Thus, section 113(h)(4) precludes judicial review of any stage
of the cleanup procedure until after actual remedial action has
been undertaken. However, the legislative history makes clear
that the phrase" 'removal or remedial action taken' is not in-
tended to preclude judicial review until the total response ac-
tion is finished if the response action proceeds in distinct and
separate stages."'1 7
For example, a surface cleanup could be challenged as vi-
olating the standards or requirements of the Act once all
the activities set forth in the Record of Decision for the
surface cleanup phase have been completed. This is con-
templated even though other separate and distinct phases
of the cleanup, such as subsurface cleanup, remain to be
undertaken as part of the total response action." 8
115. Id.
116. H.R. 1550, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 132 CONG. REc. H. 9582 (1986).
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The Administrator is directed to set forth each distinct
and separate stage of a response action in a separate Record
of Decision document. So as not to stall response actions, any
challenge to a particular stage "shall not interfere with those
stages of the response action which have not been com-
pleted." '119 Additionally, a citizen cannot challenge the ade-
quacy of a remedial investigation and feasibility study, as it is
a removal action, until the remedial action itself has been
taken.
The rationale in limiting such pre-implementation review
is to ensure expeditious cleanups. 120 To offset this restriction
on judicial review, Congress included provisions for public
participation in the selection of the cleanup plan. In light of
the administrative principles of exhaustion, it is arguable that,
in order to challenge a cleanup plan, a citizen must have par-
ticipated in the selection of a cleanup plan pursuant to section
117.
V. Section 104(i)-Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry
Section 104(i) establishes, within the Public Health Ser-
vice, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
(ATSDR). 121 The function of the ATSDR is to furnish and
assess information concerning hazardous substances and to
make this information available to individuals, the states, and
the EPA. This information is gathered and assessed in a num-
ber of ways. First, through the preparation of a prioritized list
of hazardous substances, which are most commonly found at
facilities on the NPL and which pose the most significant po-
tential threat to human health and the environment.1 2 Sec-
ond, through the preparation of toxicological profiles of the
substances listed pursuant to paragraph (2) above.1 23 Third,
119. Id:
120. H.R. 1550, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H. 9583 (1986).
121. CERCLA, supra note 2, at § 104(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i).
122. Id. at § 104(i)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(2)(A).
123. Id. at § 104(i)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(3). The profiles include A) an exami-
nation and interpretation of available toxicological information in order to determine
[Vol. 6
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through the preparation of health assessments that must be
done for each facility on the NPL"2 " and that may be pre-
pared "for releases or facilities where individual persons or li-
censed physicians provide information that individuals have
been exposed to a hazardous substance, for which the proba-
ble source of such exposure is a release."' 25 All three of these
methods for gathering information are non-discretionary du-
ties that must be performed by the Administrator of the
ATSDR. Individuals or licensed physicians may either provide
information through formal or informal methods or may peti-
tion the Administrator of the ATSDR providing such infor-
mation and requesting a health assessment. If, after being pe-
titioned, the Administrator does not initiate a health
assessment he must provide a written explanation of why the
assessment was not appropriate.' An individual is entitled to
judicial review of the denial to initiate a health assessment."'
After a health assessment is completed, the results and recom-
mendations for further action, if any, are given to the Admin-
istrator of the EPA and the affected states. Additionally, and
of importance to potentially threatened citizens:
[I]f the health assessment indicates that the release or
the levels of significant human exposure and the health effects of such exposure; B) a
determination of the availability of adequate information on the health effects; and
C) where appropriate, the identification of toxicological testing needed to identify the
types or levels of exposure that may present significant adverse health effects. Id. at §
104(i)(3)(A)-(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(3)(A)-(C).
124. Id. at § 104(i)(6)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(6)(A) (emphasis added). Health
assessments shall include preliminary assessments of the potential risk to human
health posed by individual sites and facilities, based on such factors as the nature and
extent of contamination, the existence of potential pathways of human exposure (in-
cluding ground or surface water contamination, air emissions, and food contamina-
tion), the size and potential susceptibility of the community within the likely path-
ways of exposure, the comparison of expected human exposure levels to the short-
term and long-term health effects associated with identified hazardous substances
and any available recommended exposure or tolerance limits for such hazardous sub-
stances, and the comparison of existing morbidity data on diseases that may be asso-
ciated with the observed levels of exposure. Id. at § 104(i)(6)(F), 42 U.S.C. §
9604(i)(6)(F).
125. Id. at § 104(i)(6)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(6)(B).
126. Id.
127. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1964 & Supp. V. 1987).
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threatened release concerned may pose a serious threat to
human health or the environment, the Administrator of
ATSDR shall so notify the Administrator of EPA who
shall promptly evaluate such release or threatened release
in accordance with the hazard ranking system ... to de-
termine whether the site shall be placed on the National
Priorities List or, if the site is already on the list, the Ad-
ministrator of ATSDR may recommend to the Adminis-
trator of EPA that the site be accorded a higher
priority. 2 "
Pursuant to the citizen suit provision, section 310(a)(2), a citi-
zen can bring a civil action against the Administrator of the
ATSDR for failure to perform any of these three non-discre-
tionary duties.
The information provided by the ATSDR can have a
number of important effects on toxic tort litigation. The toxi-
cological profiles will contain health effects statements for
particular chemicals. The statement will provide information
on the general use of particular substances, the ways in which
people can become exposed to them, and the hazards and
symptoms of diseases that may be caused by exposure. There
will be information on the risks associated with the chemicals
and discussion on the acute hazards and carcinogenicity.'29
The health assessments for all sites on the NPL "[are] essen-
tially a preliminary examination of the potential human
health risk at individual sites based on the extent of contami-
nation, the size of the exposed population, and the compari-
son of anticipated exposure levels with available literature on
tolerance limits.' '130
The potential value of this information to the toxic tort
plaintiff is yet undetermined and has received mixed ratings.
Through the toxicological profiles, a plaintiff's injuries can be
related to the toxicology quickly and inexpensively, without
128. CERCLA, supra note 2, at § 104(i)(6)(H), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(6)(H). (em-
phasis added).
129. Rogers, The Potential Role of Superfund in Toxic Tort Litigation, 3 NAT.
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the need for experts. However, defense attorneys argue that
the Congressional intent of this information is "remedial and
public, not compensatory and private,''13' and thus not admis-
sible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Although poten-
tially not admissible as evidence, the information provided by
the ATSDR may be used to form the basis of expert
opinions.132
One commentator suggests that the information may not
even be available in the near future. Despite barely making
the December 10, 1988 deadline for completion of the first
wave of health assessments, "the ATSDR Administrator
James 0. Mason admitted to Congress last June that it is
'highly unlikely' that the Agency will be able to meet its statu-
tory deadlines for FY 1989, especially given EPA's plans to
add 300-400 sites to the [NPL]."'' l Another commentator
stated that "[a]ll these assessments can accomplish is a study
with the government's seal of approval saying that nothing is
wrong with you. EPA uses ATSDR to calm community
anxiety."14
Despite these wary views, the ATSDR information has
131. Sherwood & Fitzsimmons, The ATSDR: A Plaintiff's Dream Come True? 2
Toxics L. REP. 1072, 1075 (Mar. 1988).
132. Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits an expert to form an
opinion based on (1) firsthand information, (2) facts or data presented to him at trial,
and (3) data that could not be admitted into evidence, provided it is data reasonably
relied upon by experts in the field. Id. at 1078 (citing FED. R. EVID. 703); See also 3
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, § 703(1) (1989).
133. Steinzor, SARA's Unfulfilled Promises: What They Mean for Toxic Tort
Litigation, 3 Toxics L. REP. 803 (Nov. 1988) (quoting statement of James 0. Mason,
M.D., Ph.d., Administrator, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry,
before the Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight, and
Investigations, U.S. House of Representatives, June 20, 1988, at 7).
134. Id. at 804. Yet another attorney believes that:
SARA will hurt toxic tort plaintiffs more than help them because it puts gov-
ernment and industry in the position to say that medical monitoring pro-
grams, an increasingly important type of relief sought by toxic tort plaintiffs,
is not necessary because a government program is set up to deal with such
activities.
Id. Nonetheless, courts continue to be willing to allow recovery for medical monitor-
ing, see, e.g., Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. (M.D. Tenn. 1988); Lykins v. Westing-
house Electric Corp., 27 E.R.C. 1590 (E.D. Ky. 1988); Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F.
Supp. 1425 (D.C. Ohio 1984); United States v. Septa, 24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1860,
1863 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
1989]
25
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
the potential for use by the treating physician. At the very
least, the information can be used to narrow the focus on what
chemicals are present at the site, and then symptoms mani-
fested by the victim can be matched with the symptoms of
diseases that may be caused by those chemicals.
VI. Conclusion
CERCLA can be very useful to a citizen who is concerned
about the health hazards associated with residing near a haz-
ardous waste facility. Despite the absence of a CERCLA pro-
vision allowing a citizen to compel a PRP to cleanup a site,
there are a number of avenues a citizen can take. These ave-
nues range from the costly route of private action, to the less
burdensome routes of petitioning the government and partici-
pating in cleanup plan selection. In addition, a citizen can
bring a toxic tort action in state court and use the information
provided by the ATSDR as a basis for his claim.
Andrea L. Bull
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